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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY
Respondent, the State of Utah, argues that Appellants were not
personally served with the admittedly defective subpoenas and
therefore, regardless

of the methods employed

to obtain the

evidence used against them, they should not be allowed to complain.
This

argument

ignores Appellants' rights to due process

and

fundamental fairness in the gathering and use of evidence by the
State.

It also ignores the constitutional abuses in this case

which have been previously recognized by this Court, and which, if
allowed to go uncorrected, would deny Appellants their rights to
uniform operation of the law.

Finally, the State fails to

recognize the infirmities in both the ruling of the trial court and
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals which necessitate reversal.
ARGUMENT
I.
APPELLANTS HAVE STANDING TO RAISE
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
A.

DUE PROCESS

Contrary to Respondent's assertions at page 17 of its brief,
a finding of a violation of Appellants' rights to due process is
not

dependent

on whether

they received

defective

subpoenas.

Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution provides "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law. ••

This language echoes the guarantees of the fifth and

fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The State

seeks

to

deprive

Appellants

of

their

liberty.

Therefore,

Appellants clearly have standing to challenge the actions of the
State on the ground that those actions, from the initiation of the
investigation through the trial and subsequent appeal, denied them
their fundamental rights of due process.
The interest sought to be protected by the fairness standard
of the due process clause is an evidentiary interest. Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967);
708 P.2d

906

(1985).

State v. Edwards, 109 Idaho App. 501,

The fundamental principles of fairness

embodied by due process apply to the procedures used by the State
in obtaining evidence. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952);
People v. Ellis, 55 Cal. Rptr. 358, 421 P.2d 393 (1966). Admission
of

evidence

seized

in violation

of

constitutional

standards

violates due process. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1960); State v.
Hull, 158 Mont. 6, 487 P.2d 1314 (1971).
When the State seeks to deprive a person of life, liberty, or
property, the Constitution requires that the State's actions be
guided not merely by technical requirements, but by the concept of
fundamental fairness.
(1976);

Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 99, 113

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983).

The

individual time, place, and circumstances of the case must be
examined to determine if the State's actions in investigating and
prosecuting

1772-9A.PL3

the offense

are consistent with the concepts of

2

fundamental fairness which form the foundation of our notion of
due process.

See Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah

1980); Trade Comm'n v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 21 Utah 2d. 431,
446 P.2d 958 (1968).
As previously pointed out, the investigation in the instant
case was fatally flawed from its inception. Judge Bunnell, in his
Memorandum Decision, indicates some of the abuses which occurred
during the investigation.

This Court, in In the Matter of a

Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d

633 (Utah 1988) [hereinafter

"Investigation"] has acknowledged the Constitutional violations
that occurred in the investigation:

"as the attorney general

concedes, the Subpoena Powers Act was improperly applied. . . ."
Id. at 658.
The Attorney General, in his Brief, ignores these abuses as
if they should be given no further consideration even though nearly
all of the evidence submitted at trial was obtained through
unconstitutional means. Each subpoena misstated that it was issued
by the District Court and that disobedience could be summarily
punished by contempt.

Investigation, 754 P.2d at 658-59.

Thus,

all of the evidence gathered in response to these Subpoenas was
gathered in a manner which unduly coerced the recipient to supply
the information in violation of their rights. This was compounded
by the fact, noted by Judge Bunnell, that many of the subpoenas

1772-9A.PL3
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were extremely overbroad and exceeded the scope of the good cause
affidavit. (See Judge Bunnell's Memorandum Decision, Appellant's
Brief, Appendix page 4.)

Thus, much of the information gathered

in the course of the investigation was beyond the scope of what
would have been lawfully obtainable through valid subpoenas.

"It

is contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search
through all [Defendants'] records, relevant or irrelevant in the
hope that something will turn up."

Federal Trade Comm'n v.

American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1923).

This is precisely

the manner in which the investigation of the instant case was
conducted.
The State continued to conduct the investigation in the same
unconstitutional fashion, even after criminal charges had been
brought. Investigation. 754 P.2d at 638.
firmly

established

in

grand

This violates the rule,

jury proceedings, that

once

an

indictment has been handed down, the prosecution cannot use grand
jury investigative powers to secure additional evidence.

See In

re Grand Jury Proceedings, 632 F.2d 1033, 1041 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Fisher, 455 F.2d 1101, 1104-05 (2d Cir. 1972).
This rule should apply with equal or greater force when the
Subpoena

Powers

Act

is

involved

since

this

Act

lacks

the

protections inherent in the grand jury process. See Investigation,
754 P.2d at 658.

1772-9A.PL3
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This Court has previously considered the proper function of
the Subpoena Powers Act in determining what procedural safeguards
were necessary to meet due process requirements.
754 P.2d at 652.

Investigation,

The requirements that this Court placed on the

Subpoena Powers Act in that case were based on the use of the Act
as a preliminary investigative tool.

Id.

In the instant case, the requirements that the Court imposed
for proper use of the Act as a preliminary investigative tool were
not met. Id. at 658-659. Also, the investigation continued in the
same

unconstitutional

manner

following

the

filing

of

formal

criminal charges. After filing, Appellants were entitled not only
to the protections imposed on preliminary investigations, but to
the "full procedural safeguards appropriate in adjudicative or
accusative

proceedings."

Id.

Appellants

were

denied

the

procedural safeguards inherent in the guarantee of due process of
law both before and after charges were brought.
This error was compounded when the trial court shifted the
burden to Appellants of proving a substantial violation of their
rights and lack of good faith during the suppression hearing. Due
process of law requires that the State, in order to convict a
citizen of a crime, must carry the burden of proof. When the State
impermissibly shifts the burden to the defendant, the result is a

1772-9A.PL3
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denial of due process.

See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah

1987).
The three due process violations outlined above; the failure
to

provide

required

procedural

safeguards

during

the

investigation, the continuation of the investigation in the same
manner

following

the

filing

of

criminal

charges,

and

the

impermissible shifting of the burden of proof to the Appellants at
the

suppression

hearing,

allowed

the

State

to

gain,

by

unconstitutional means, unfair advantage in the litigation.
There can be no question that Appellants were prejudiced by
the State's use of information obtained through overbroad and
impermissibly coercive subpoenas.

It is undisputed that all, or

nearly all, of the evidence introduced at trial was obtained
through the use of these subpoenas.
hearing,

page

5; Appendix

page

(Transcript of suppression

1).

Where

an

accused

can

demonstrate prejudice resulting from the State's misconduct, he is
entitled to a dismissal of charges based on a denial of due
process.

State v. Edmonson, 113 Idaho 230, 743 P.2d 459 (1987).

See also State v. Lewis, 107 N.M. App. 182, 754 P.2d 853 (1988)
(where the state obtains a tactical advantage over the accused
through violation of due process, dismissal is required).
In

the

face

of

the

unconstitutional

conduct

of

the

investigation and the failure to suppress the evidence at trial

1772-9A.PL3
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due

to

the

application

of

an unconstitutional

statute, the

fundamental principles of fairness embodied by the concepts of due
process demand that Appellants' convictions be reversed.
B.

EQUAL PROTECTION

Respondent at page 19 of its Brief acknowledges that the
State's failure to disclose the good cause affidavit and the
overbroad application of the secrecy provisions of the Subpoena
Powers Act create

"legitimate concerns."

However, Respondent

contends that these violations "raise no legitimate issue as to the
rights of persons not subpoenaed."

Id.

Appellants contend that the persons entitled to "uniform
operation of laws" as guaranteed by Article I, Section 24 of the
Utah Constitution are those persons against whom the State seeks
to apply the law.

In the case of the Subpoena Powers Act, Utah

Code Annotated, § 77-22-1 et seq. (1982), the persons against whom
the law is applied are the targets of the investigation.

The

protection inherent in Article I, Section 24, requires uniform
operation of the laws from the moment the statute is used to
instigate an investigation. The requirements of uniform operation
apply to all those affected by the operation of the law, especially
the target of the investigation.

This is true, regardless of

whether or not the target of the investigation is personally served
with a subpoena.

1772-9A.PL3
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Respondent offers no rationale to support its assertion that
the Court must extend to the target the right to notice of
subpoenas given to

"the target's banker, accountant, business

associates, friends, relatives, etc., etc., etc., . . ."in order
for Appellants to have their equal protection claim recognized.
Clearly, if the court imposed such a notice requirement, Appellants
would be entitled to its "uniform application." However, this does
not mean that Appellants are any less entitled to have "uniform
application" of the requirements previously imposed by this court
in In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation.
The State, in this case, applied the Subpoena Powers Act in
a manner which this Court has recognized as unconstitutional.

If

applied in the same manner in future cases, the investigation would
be

subject

to dismissal

and

the evidence

gathered

would

be

suppressed; otherwise, the safeguards provided in In the Matter of
a Criminal Investigation would be meaningless.
There is no justification for allowing the Subpoena Powers Act
to be applied to Appellants in a manner this Court has found
impermissible. Article I, Section 24 requires uniform application
of the laws of this State.

Allowing the State to conduct an

investigation targeted at Appellants in an unconstitutional manner
denies them this right.

1772-9A.PL3
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C.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1.

Recognition of a Right of Privacy Under the State
Constitution,

The

State

argues

that

seizure

of

Appellants'

"papers"

including bank records, business records, records in the hands of
their accountants, employees or associates did not violate their
rights since the papers were in the hands of third parties when
seized. In support Respondent cites cases which hold that a person
has no "expectation of privacy" in records kept by his bank.
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Respondent's argument ignores Appellants' rights asserted
independently under the Utah State Constitution.

Article I, § 14

of the Utah Constitution provides that "the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated . . . ."
Under the reasoning advanced by Respondent, a person's papers and
effects are not entitled to any protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures unless those papers and effects are in the
person's home or physical possession.
If

this

were

the

intent

Constitution, the use of

of

the terms

the

framers

"papers

of

the

Utah

and effects" is

redundant. Having already afforded rights to security in "persons
and houses" no additional rights would be created by use of the
terms "papers and effects," if those papers and effects are only

1772-9A.PL3
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to be secure if located on a "person" or in his "house." By adding
the

terms

"papers

and

effects,"

the

framers

of

the

Utah

Constitution recognized that our rights extend beyond the borders
of our property to include certain papers and effects in which we
have an expectation of privacy, regardless of their physical
location.
California has recognized this right of privacy under the
provisions of its State Constitution.
118 Cal. Rptr. 165, 529 P.2d 590 (1974).

Burrows v. Superior Court,
This right is not limited

to bank records, but extends to other private papers such as credit
card receipts and telephone registers.
Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738 (1979).
lead

and

recognized,

under

People v. Blair, 159 Cal.

Other States have followed this
the

provisions

of

their

State

Constitutions, a right of privacy1 in papers and records in the
hands of a third party.

See Winfield v. Division of Pari-Mutuel

Wagering, 477 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1985); People v. Jackson, 116 111.
App. 3d 430, 452 N.E.2d 85 (1983); Benson v. People 703 P.2d 1277
(Colo. 1985); Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117
(1980); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283

x

(Pa. 1979).

In State v. Thompson, 745 P.2d 1087 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987),
the Idaho Court of Appeals gives a well-reasoned review of the
rationale supporting the extension of a privacy interest under the
State Constitutions to cover areas left unprotected by Federal
common law.
The Thompson court found that a telephone pen
register constituted a "search" under the Idaho Constitution.
1772-9A.PL3
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Attorneys, health care providers, accountants, bankers, and
real estate agents, all recognize that information entrusted to
them may be confidential in nature.

The disclosure of such

information without notice can be both a breach of their clients'
trust and confidence, as well as a breach of a legal or ethical
duty. Courts have recognized the sensitive nature of many business
records by issuing protective orders preventing disclosure of such
information revealed during the course of depositions or discovery.
Therefore, a person's reliance on the privacy of papers, records
or documents in the hands of a third party is not something new,
novel, or foreign to the manner in which citizens conduct their
affairs.

The recognition of a limited right of privacy in certain

important records, papers and documents held by third persons would
merely confirm the expectation already held by our citizens that
such records will be held confidential.
Recognizing such a right will not unduly burden the State in
the investigation and prosecution of offenses. The information is
subject to discovery through the use of valid
subpoenas or the execution of
2.

investigative

warrants issued on probable cause.

The Evidence Admitted as "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree."

When the Defendant can show that a substantial portion of the
seized documents are tainted, the government has the burden of
establishing which documents are free from the taint and therefore

1772-9A.PL3
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admissible. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183 (1968);
United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1983).

In the

instant case it has previously been determined that the overbroad
application of the secrecy order, the representations that the
subpoenas

were

issued

by

the

District

Court

and

summarily

punishable by contempt, and the failure to notify the recipients
of

the

subpoenas

of

the

general

nature

and

scope

of

the

investigation violated the recipients' rights of self incrimination
and constituted unreasonable searches. Investigation, 754 P.2d at
658-59.
Because of the secret manner in which the investigation was
carried out it is not possible to reconstruct in precise detail the
chain of discovery for each piece of information or testimony
obtained through the use of invalid

subpoenas.

Neither the

subpoenas themselves nor the complete record of the investigation
are contained in the record on Appeal.

However, the record does

reveal that the trial took in excess of two weeks, covering over
1500 pages of transcript. Fifty-nine witnesses were called and the
State presented approximately

174 exhibits.

R-687-698.

The

incremental nature of the investigation is clear from the evidence
presented, each round of subpoenas expanding on and following the
leads

provided

by

the

information

subpoenas and depositions.

1772-9A.PL3
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discovered

through

prior

In United States v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1964), the
government illegally taped a conversation between Leo Guzik, a
lawyer for Pase Motors, and Sam Goldstein, president of Union Local
239.

When Wesley Pase was confronted with the illegally taped

conversation, he implicated the Defendant Tane. The District Court
dismissed the indictment on the grounds that Pase's testimony was
the product of a illegal wire tap and therefore inadmissible as
"fruits of the poisonous tree."

The Second Circuit Court of

Appeals affirmed the lower Court's ruling holding that Tane had
standing to challenge the admissibility of the evidence and
sustained dismissal of the charges. That case and those which have
followed it stand for the proposition that testimony of a witness
uncovered through unconstitutional searches is inadmissible as
"fruits of the poisonous tree."

See United States v. Karathanos,

531 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1976); Williams v. United States, 382 F.2d 48
(5th Cir. 1967).
In the instant case the State does not dispute that all or
nearly all of the evidence and testimony presented at trial was a
direct or indirect result of the infirm subpoenas issued as part
of the criminal investigation conducted in Emery County. (See
Suppression Transcript Hearing Page 5: Appendix Page 1; see also
Investigation. 754 P.2d at 658) The State makes no attempt in its
brief to justify the admission of evidence under an exception to

1772-9A.PL3
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the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine.2

The Defendant has

demonstrated that all or nearly all the evidence is tainted by the
State's unconstitutional conduct during the investigation.

The

State has failed to meet its burden of showing that any of the
evidence introduced at trial is free of the taint of the invalid
subpoenas which lead to its discovery. Therefore the evidence need
be suppressed as "fruits of the poisonous tree."
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
The Court of Appeals rejected Respondent's arguments regarding
standing finding that, "Defendant's claims to an expectation of
privacy are rights protected by the Fourth Amendment."

State v.

Thompson. 751 P.2d 807, 809 (Utah App. 1988) (citing Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)).

The Court of Appeals recognized

that the trial court's rationale in failing to suppress the
evidence at trial was invalid. .Id.

However, it upheld the trial

court's ruling claiming independent reliance on Illionis v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340 (1987).

2

Compare United States v. Namer, 835 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir.
1988), where the Court found that infirm warrants seeking business
records revealed the names of key witnesses; however, the
government met its burden of showing that it also obtained the
names from an independent source, free of the taint of the invalid
subpoenas.
1772-9A.PL3
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As outlined

in Appellant's

brief, the Court of Appeals

reliance on Krull is misplaced (See Appellant's brief pp. 21-33).
Krull does not apply where the statute relied upon is found to be
constitutional.

It does not apply where, as here, exclusion of

the evidence would have a deterrent effect upon the violation of
individual rights.

It does not apply where, as here, there is no

good faith reliance on the statutory language. Application of the
principles espoused in Krull to violations of rights created by our
State Constitution is prevented by the mandatory and prohibitory
language of Article I, § 26 of the Utah Constitution. Krull deals
only with violations of the Fourth Amendment.

Reliance on Krull

does not and cannot sustain the trial court's ruling given the
violations of due process and equal protection established by
Appellants.
Respondent does not attempt to support the Court of Appeals'
reliance on Krull, nor does it offer an alterative rationale upon
which this Court could rely.

In the absence of any supporting

rationale the ruling of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's grounds for denying Appellants' Motion to
Suppress have been held unconstitutional by this Court.

State v.

Thompson. 751 P.2d at 809; State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah
1987).

The actions of the State in gathering that evidence have

1772-9A.PL3
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also been held unconstitutional.

In the Matter of a Criminal

Investigation. 754 P.2d at 658. The Court of Appeals' reliance on
Illinois v. Krull, as an independent basis for the admission of the
evidence, is misplaced.
Appellants have demonstrated that their rights to due process
were denied in the manner in which the State obtained the evidence
used against them and in the standards used to determine the
admissibility of the evidence at trial.

Appellants have also

demonstrated that allowing the Subpoena Powers Act to be applied
to them in this manner denies them "uniform operation" of the laws
of this State.
Wherefore, Appellants respectfully request that this Court
reverse the rulings of the lower court and order that all evidence
and testimony submitted at trial which were the products of the
criminal investigation conducted under the Subpoena Powers Act be
suppressed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of July, 1989.
SESSIONS & MOORE

JOHN F. CLARK

1772-9A.PL3
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered, on this
the

day of July, 1989, true and accurate copies of the

foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS, to:
R. Paul Van Dam
Stanley H. Olsen
Robert M. Parrish
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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APPENDIX

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

QAJLOCJUUC

5
6

STATE OF UTAH,

7
8
9
10
11

)
)

CRIMINAL NO. CR-84-1115

)

PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT

L. BRENT FLETCHER, MICHAEL C.)
THOMPSON, BRUCE A. CONKLIN,
AND MICHAEL ZIEMSKI,
)

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

PLAINTIFF,
-VS-

DEFENDANTS.

)

12
13
14
15
16

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON THE 27TH DAY OF

17

DECEMBER, 1984, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 4:15 O'CLOCK P.M.,

18

THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE

19

COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT

20

LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE

21

HONORABLE JUDITH M. BILLINGS, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL

22

DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH.
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EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
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1

' STATING THAT THIS IS SOMETHING THAT'S NOT WITHIN MY JURIS-

2

| DICTION AND HE VIEWED THE SUPPRESSION ISSUE AS BEING BEYOND

3

THE SCOPE OF HIS AUTHORITY, BUT OBVIOUSLY, HE DID BELIEVE

4

THAT THE ISSUANCE OF THE AUTHORITY AND THE CONSTITUTION-

5

ALITY OF THAT AUTHORITY TO BE SOMETHING WITHIN HIS JURIS-

6

DICTION, WHICH IT CLEARLY WAS.

7

HIS AUTHORITY THAT THOSE SUBPOENAS WERE ISSUED AND THE

8

SUBPOENAS GENERATED ALMOST ALL OF THE EVIDENCE AGAINST US

9

AND MR. FLETCHER WERE ISSUED UPON HIS AUTHORITY.

10

I MEAN, IT WAS, AFTER ALL,

AND THERE

IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT.

11

I

12

I RECEIVED THE SUBPOENAS AND IT'S CLEAR THAT, AS TO THE DOCU-

PURSUANT TO THIS COURT'S DIRECTION WE HAVE

13

MENTARY EVIDENCE AT LEAST, THAT ALMOST ALL OF IT, IF NOT

14

MAYBE ALL OF IT BUT AS FAR AS I CAN TELL ALMOST ALL OF IT

15

IF NOT ALL OF IT, WAS OBTAINED THROUGH THAT PROCESS.

16

JUDGE BILLINGS:

I'LL TELL YOU WHAT I'M HAVING

17

TROUBLE WITH, AND MAYBE YOU CAN HELP ME, IS HOW THAT IS

18

THE LAW OF THIS CASE WHEN THIS CASE WASN'T EVEN FILED WHEN

19

THAT OCCURRED AND WHEN HE RULED THAT, BUT RATHER, AS A WHOLE

20

DIFFERENT CASE UNDER A DIFFERENT ACT WHICH MAY, YOU KNOW,

21
22
23
24
25

LEAD TO THIS CASE, BUT I'M HAVING TROUBLE WITH WHY IT'S
NOT LIKE JUDGE DANIELS' RULES THE D.U.I. LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN ONE CASE AND I HAVE THE EXACT SAME FACTS IN
ANOTHER CASE AND I SAY NO, IT'S NOT.
MR. WHEELER:

I THINK THAT SOME OF WHAT HE DID

